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With each farm bill cycle there are calls for a major rethinking of U.S. farm policy 
to make it better suit current farm conditions and the expectations of the broader 
American public about the roles of agriculture.  These calls for reform have been 
for the most part been unsuccessful because there has been no argument 
compelling enough to overcome advocates of the status quo.  But as time passes 
the wisdom of maintaining a set of policies that have their basis in the 1930s and 
were designed to support a structure of agriculture that no longer exists becomes 
more questionable. And with each farm bill, policy shifts to include more aspects  
of agriculture than simply support for the production of farm commodities (Heuer, 
2001). 
 
One alternative that has been proposed as a new way to restructure farm policy 
is the concept of multifunctionality. It is based on a belief that farming produces 
multiple outputs, only some of which have market prices and many of which are 
public goods.  In addition the production process is one where there is a link 
among outputs so that levels of one output are linked to production levels of 
another (OECD, 2001).  Those advocating the use of multifunctionality as a way 
to think about agriculture and agricultural policy argue that  in the 21
st century 
many of the non-market outputs of agriculture are being under produced, and 
that the existence of jointness of production and the public good nature of major 
agricultural outputs requires a different and more systematic approach to 
agricultural policy.  Three explanations for a socially undesirable mix of products 
are: 
•  that as society has become more wealthy and food outlays are a smaller 
share of household expenditures, the positive non-market values of 
agriculture, mainly visual amenity and environmental benefits, have 
become relatively more valuable, 
•  at the same time new production technology has led agriculture to adopt 
practices that increase the relative quantity of undesirable nonmarket 
outputs, such as pollution, and questionable food safety and animal 
welfare practices, and,  
•  agricultural policy by continuing to favor increases in the quantity of 
market outputs through price supports and other policies sends 
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inappropriate signals to farmers encouraging higher levels of production of 
the subsidized commodities. 
 
To date these arguments have not been very successful in the United States, but 
they do provide a basis for thinking about alternatives to current policy.  
 
Current Farm Policy and Multifunctionality 
 
In recent years a large amount of the discussion of agricultural policy in the 
developed countries has focused on the trade effects of the various elements of 
farm policy.  This has been most evident in the work of the OECD which has 
created a well recognized methodology for identifying the extent to which the 
various elements of national policy are trade distorting (OECD, 2002).  The focus 
on trade is important because financial returns to farming in the industrial 
countries are typically now more dependent upon trade than ever.  Ironically as 
the domestic role of agriculture has declined in terms of the share of population 
and share of GDP, its international role has become more visible.  As a result, 
agricultural exports remain important for a considerable number of the 
industrialized countries. In turn these exports, when subsidized, create significant 
problems for the development prospects of many poorer countries by crowding 
out their farm exports and by weakening broader arguments for trade 
liberalization. 
 
Blandford and Boisvert (2002a) argue that the current  structure of trade policy 
dispute resolution is fundamentally incapable of dealing with multifunctionality as 
an argument for agricultural policy.  If outputs are linked then what may appear to 
be an output subsidy for an agricultural commodity may in fact be the payment 
necessary for farmers to produce the optimal quantity of a non-market public 
good that is jointly produced (p.114 - 118).  For a country that chooses to protect 
its domestic production this creates a plausible rationale for price supports. Given 
this it is clear why exporting countries cling to the argument that agriculture 
produces multiple outputs but they can be produced using separable production 
technologies.  If joint-production links are established among priced and unpriced 
outputs, trade issues cannot be cleanly separated from domestic issues and 
trade agreements become both harder to negotiate and enforce.  
 
But while agricultural trade issues are an element in agricultural policy, the main 
forces driving this policy are domestic.  Trade effects are only the tail of the farm 
policy dog, and this means that domestic considerations mainly dictate how 
policy is developed and implemented.  This is particularly true in the United 
States and Europe, the two dominant economic regions with major agricultural 
trade distorting policies.  In Europe CAP reform would benefit consumers and 
facilitate enlargement, but the interests of some member states in protecting their 
farmers have proved a major impediment to bringing it about.  In the United 





new farm policy that is widely seen as moving the United States away from the 
principles of freer trade that were important in the 1996 FAIR act.  
 
To reinforce this point it is useful to summarize the main differences between the 
1996 and 2002 acts. With the previous farm bill of 1996 the United States 
seemed to be adopting a policy that would lead to farmers being weaned from 
government subsides and many federal regulations. But the bill was developed 
under the assumption that long run market conditions would be favorable and 
that U.S. farmers would be highly competitive in international markets.  
Production decisions of farmers were to finally be decoupled from federal 
payments, and transition payments that compensated producers for this policy 
shift were to decline over the life of the bill. However in 2002 four years of high 
emergency government payouts in excess of $30 billion to protect farm income 
and weak short term prospects for improved prices, were combined with a major 
political battle for control of the Congress. The result was a situation where both 
major political parties believed that they could not afford to alienate farmers by 
refusing to provide generous levels of support in a new farm bill.  Thus the 2002 
farm bill was not about trade, and it was not even really about what was best in 
the long run for U.S. agriculture.  What it was about was a critical battle for the 
votes of farmers in a handful of states in the Midwest and South, where the 
number of farm votes is large enough to decide the balance of power in both the 
Senate and the House of Representatives in the 2002 national mid-term 
elections. 
 
The result is a farm policy that returns to the old approach of providing counter-
cyclical price supports to a small number of major commodities, but FSARI 
preserves the important change from 1996 of decoupling support from production 
decisions.  Farmers are not required to reduce planted acres in order to receive 
support, although the level of support is capped, both in terms of aggregate 
payment value and the size of the eligible production base. The result is a bill 
that has a projected outlay over its life that is likely to set a new record for farm 
income support, even though the number of farmers continues to decline. The 
trade consequences of FSARI have been widely criticized, notwithstanding the 
commitment made by the United States not to exceed any of the caps on support 
levels it agreed to under WTO. Nevertheless the new bill clearly will adversely 
affect the agricultural exports of developing countries and cannot be seen as 
making future trade negotiations easier. 
 
But how does this new U.S. legislation relate to multifunctionality?  In the most 
obvious sense there is no direct link, because multifunctionality is not a concept 
that received any attention in the legislation.  This continues past U.S. policy in 
the sense that when multifunctionality is explicitly considered it is seen as a 
foreign strategy that will harm U.S. interests.  The conventional American view of 
multifunctionality is that it is promoted by countries with no comparative 
advantage in agriculture to protect their domestic producers from competition.  





production subsidies that have been limited under WTO agreements and create . 
trade barriers.  
 
From a U.S. policy perspective multifunctionality is a suspect concept for two 
reasons.  First it is seen as being mainly about trade protection and not about 
enhancing efficiency, and second it implies a more coordinated and unified 
notion of agricultural policy formation than is seen as desirable in the United 
States.  This latter point is important because for many Americans a more active 
policy suggests that the government, and not market forces, may play the main 
role in agriculture.  
 
Multiple Outputs and Multifunctionality  
 
Although multifunctionality is an alien term in U.S. farm policy many of the 
concepts that underlie it are important factors in the policy process. These 
include: a concern with the environmental and wildlife habitat consequences of 
farming, the link between agriculture and rural development, and the amenity 
value of farms. This is evident by the inclusion of multiple references in Food and 
Agricultural Policy: Taking Stock for the New Century, the most recent USDA 
farm policy document, to the importance of recognizing the multiple outputs of 
agriculture and of forming policy that is sensitive to them (for example, USDA 
2001, p.2, p.10, p.16). 
 
In Food and Agricultural Policy there is an explicit recognition that farm 
production and farm policy should be driven by domestic consumer demands that 
encompass not only the nature and quantity of the outputs, but also how they are 
produced. Although high levels of agricultural exports are recognized as being 
vital to the financial well-being of most farmers because the current level of 
output cannot be absorbed domestically, policy has to do more than promote 
exports.  In particular, the document recognizes that: only some farmers benefit 
from past policy, that a significant share of the benefits flow to unintended 
recipients and that there have been adverse environmental and food safety 
consequences from past policy, as well as negative impacts on rural 
communities. The document makes it clear that there are multiple goals for 
agriculture and for agricultural policy even though it does not explicitly identify 
which are the most important, nor whether there are minimum acceptable levels 
for some goals. 
 
At the most fundamental level the United States has implicitly accepted a major 
part of the concept of multifunctionality. While farm legislation started out with a 
relatively narrow focus of preserving farmers￿ income by stabilizing and 
supporting crop prices over time there has been a steady broadening of the 
subjects considered and types of programs funded (Cochrane, 1993). Thus there 






The United States has also applied the concept of balancing multiple uses of 
resources for a long time in other resource management activities. Within USDA 
and a number of other federal agencies multiple-use management of public lands 
has long been a central principle for forests and range land and for river 
management.  In each of these cases public policy initially emphasized a single 
activity, tree harvesting, livestock grazing and navigation or flood control and 
endorsed practices that maximized the benefits from that activity.  Over time 
those who placed a value on other outputs that were adversely affected by the 
emphasis on producing the primary target good began to try to influence public 
policy. Initially this process was driven by local concerns but it steadily became 
more centralized with national objectives becoming part of the management 
process. In 1960 the U.S. Forest Service was formally required by the Multiple 
Use Sustained Yield Act to consider competing and complementary  uses for 
forests (Bowes and Krutilla, 1989).  These requirements were steadily expanded 
by legislation through the rest of the 1960s and the 1970s and extended to range 
land and rivers. Relative to other countries the United States has a lot of 
experience with both policies and management practices associated with multiple 
uses. 
 
However while the United States has recognized the importance of developing 
special plans where multiple outputs are produced in a variety of circumstances it 
has never embraced the full concept of multifunctionality. In particular there is 
only limited support within the United States for a key element of 
multifunctionality ￿ jointness of production (Abler, 2001b; Bohman, Cooper, 
Mullarkey, Normile, Skully, Vogel and Young, 1999).  It is generally accepted in 
the United States that agriculture, like forests and rivers, has multiple outputs, 
including both those with market values and those without, but the usual 
assumption is that the outputs are in some sense separable and therefore 
appropriate levels of each output can be achieved by choosing a specific policy 
that addresses that particular output.  Thus if soil erosion is a consequence of 
agricultural production, it can be addressed through specific policies and 
regulations that deal with erosion, and these policies can be developed 
independently of commodity price policy.   
 
If the outputs of agriculture are not separable, in that levels of one output 
determine levels of another, it is more difficult to achieve any given desired 
mix of outputs without explicitly taking the linkages into consideration.  Using the 
previous example it would be hard to get the desired level of conservation 
without modifying commodity price policy as well as conservation policy. But, 
even with jointness there is still the possibility for something other than 
government policy to bring about a more desirable mix of outputs (Abler 2001a; 
Normile and Bohman, 2002). And it is not clear that more active government 








Explanations of U.S. Skepticism 
 
Given its long experience with multiple-use, an obvious question is why has the 
United States not embraced multifunctionality?  It is clear that there is not a lot of 
difference between multiple-use and multifunctionality as far as concepts go, but 
there are important differences in the evolution of the two ideas as distinct pieces 
of public policy. Multifunctionality is a recent term that came out of European 
discussions of sustainability in the early 1990s.  It reflects efforts to 
operationalize the ideas of sustainability in the context of farming practices.  In 
this case the concept or theory came first and there is now an effort to take the 
concept and implement it as an auxiliary element in a largely private sector, 
agriculture.  As Abler puts it: ￿The primary function of agriculture is to supply food 
and fibre. However, agriculture can also be a source of several non-commodity 
outputs and negative externalities.￿ (Abler, 2001b; p.4). 
 
By contrast multiple-use developed as a management practice in forests in the 
1900s as demand patterns shifted in ways that made outputs other than timber 
more significant in the surrounding communities.  Individual forests were 
managed according to plans that reflected the local interests in specific outputs.  
Thus multiple-use originated as management practice grounded in specific 
resource endowments and specific demands.  Over time certain practices were 
established as agency policy and in the 1960s were codified as legislation.  In the 
1970s as notions of sustainability and ecosystem management developed, 
multiple-use was redefined in the context of sustainability. 
 
This difference in the way policies develop has been recognized in other contexts 
as being significant.  In comparing the U.S., and European approaches to rural 
development Jean Francois-Poncet noted that in Europe there is a tendency to 
first develop a conceptual structure capable of analyzing the policy that can then 
be used to develop a holistic strategy to address it.  By contrast in the United 
States there is tendency for individuals or small groups to seize the initiative and 
develop their own pragmatic solutions which over time are assembled into a 
larger program (OECD, 1997; p.13). 
 
While multifunctionality is seen by its proponents as an innovative new option to 
address current problems in the farming sector, multiple-use in the United States 
is a time-worn policy that has been modified extensively to suit changing 
conditions in the management of public resources.  This difference in perceptions 
and fundamental differences in the nature of agriculture and the policy 
environment can provide a set of reasons for American skepticism and European 
enthusiasm.  
 
First, multiple-use in the United States has been a tool to manage public lands 
and waterways, not private property.  Altering property rights in the United states 
is an exceedingly sensitive issue and while there is considerable precedent for 





also a considerable reluctance to use this power frequently.  In particular 
because farmers have worked hard to build and maintain an image as sound 
stewards of the land, there is an additional presumption that farmers, with few 
exceptions, manage land in an environmentally sound manner.  This makes it an 
uphill battle to argue there is a federal role in the management of farm land. 
Second, U.S. policy has tended to address adverse environmental 
consequences of agriculture on an issue by issue basis.  For example, there are 
incentives for farmers to adopt conservation plans that involve whole-farm 
management practices.  there is legislation to limit ￿sod-busting￿ and ￿swamp-
busting￿ which is intended to keep land that should not be converted to crop land 
out of production.  The ￿Conservation Reserve￿ has as part of its purpose the 
removal of low productivity, environmentally sensitive land from production.  Over 
the last few decades various farm bills have made significant amounts of federal 
money available to farmers to modify their production practices in ways that 
should reduce the adverse environment consequences of farming.  The positive 
externalities associated with farming have generally not been significant national 
policy issues.. 
 
Third, land-use management in the United States is generally seen as a local 
issue, not a state issue and certainly not a federal issue.  When states do get 
involved in land use issues it is generally through enabling legislation that 
provides local governments with the authority to adopt requirements for land use.  
The separation of powers in the Constitution places major limits on federal 
authority; except on federal lands which constitute a huge percentage of the 
western half of the country.   
 
At a local level it is possible to find many of the tools being considered to 
implement multifunctionality in use.  Various jurisdictions have established zoning 
regulations that block the conversion of farmland to other uses, other places 
have established funds to purchase development rights from farmers, still other 
places employ lower tax rates for farmland but recoup the difference if the 
property is developed.  In each of these cases the community has determined 
that it has a local interest in preserving a landscape that includes agriculture. 
 
Fourth, given the physical size of the United States and the relatively high and 
growing degree of urbanization (76% of the population in 1990), most agricultural 
production takes place well away from where most people live. Agricultural 
production is concentrated in the middle of the country while the two coasts are 
experiencing the fastest population growth. Not only are most people urban 
residents, very few have any close relatives engaged in agriculture.  
Consequently, while most people have general concerns about agricultural 
production it is largely an abstract concern; not a concern with practices on 
specific farms or the well being of particular farmers.   
 
Recent USDA analysis shows that commercial farms, those with gross sales in 





agricultural production and receive 47 percent of government payments, primarily 
from commodity price support programs (USDA 2001; Appendix 1).  Their 
average total household income is $135,000 which is 2.7 times larger than the 
average U.S. household income of just over $51,000 and their net worth, or 
wealth, is far in excess of the average American family (Table 1). It is hard to 
argue that these individuals are deserving of more subsidies.  Similarly the 
largest group of farmers, the rural life-style group account for 62% of farms and 
have an average household income of more than $67,000. While they do not 
currently get a large share of government payments it is equally difficult to argue 
they should be the recipients of government support.  Only the intermediate 
group with average income of just over $43,000 might qualify as somewhat 
disadvantaged, but a more targeted program would make better public policy.  
 
Despite the relative success of farm organizations in continuing to perpetuate the 
myth of small family farms being the bedrock of the nation (Hanson), many 
people now see farming as a commercial enterprise that may already receive too 
many government subsidies and not too few. One manifestation of this is the lack 
of concern with farm abandonment and rural decline.  For some urban residents 
an increase in the amount of ￿wilderness￿ because of farm abandonment may 
actually be considered an improvement. Recall desertification is not an issue in 
the United States. As a result farming is now more a part of the popular culture of 
the past and not the present. This means that there may be a real reluctance to 
fund programs for the group of mostly wealthy people engaged in agriculture 
when there are competing demands for public funds, especially when the 
average citizen receives no visible benefits from the outlay. Thus one of the main 
premises of multifunctionality ￿ a desire to preserve a rural way of life does not fit 
well with a major part of modern American culture. 
 
Fifth, embracing multifunctionality would require a major rethinking of U.S. 
agricultural policy.  During the development of the 2002 farm bill there was a 
strong effort in the House of Representatives to refocus federal support on 
smaller farms and on environmental and amenity values, but it was soundly 
defeated. U.S. farm policy remains organized on a commodity basis to a large 
extent because those large farmers who produce the bulk of the commodities 
and receive the bulk of payments have a strong incentive to maintain the status 
quo.  Arrayed against them is a large, but loose, coalition of environmentalists, 
small farm advocates and people concerned with waste in government.  But the 
members of the coalition want different alternatives and for the most part lack the 
financial and political resources to compete effectively with the commodity 
groups (Freshwater). 
 
The policy process in the United States does not start from a single coherent 
statement of objectives and work through to the development of a set of 
coordinated policies that have clear links to the objectives.  Rather than being a 
￿rational￿ top-down structure where policies are evaluated in terms of their 





proposed policies, the system in the U.S. is based upon a consensus-based ￿ad 
hoc￿ political process. Policies are developed by legislative subcommittees for 
each commodity and policy issue independently, generally without much 
attention being paid to what is already in place or what is being proposed in other 
groups.  While there is ultimately an effort to reconcile the pieces into an 
aggregate agricultural policy that does not have major internal contradictions, the 
resulting farm bill never achieves the degree of coordination and integration that 
is implicit in the full sense of multifunctionality. 
 
For example, in U.S. farm bills among other things there are: commodity titles 
that establish price and income supports, there are conservation titles that 
determine allowable production practices and regulations for land use, there is a 
rural development title that provides support for small communities, and there is 
a food safety title.  Each title deals with a specific aspect of agriculture, but each 
deals with just that aspect of agriculture and there is no general set of rules that 
links the pieces into a comprehensive whole. The entire farm bill is developed 
piece by piece, with individual sub-committees in the House and Senate having 
responsibility for creating their part of the bill (Hansen, 1991). At the next stage 
the pieces are assembled and each aggregate bill is brought out of the two 
Agriculture Committees for consideration by the two legislative bodies. At this 
stage each proposal can still be significantly amended. The final piece of 
legislation reflects a further process of negotiation, where the House of 
Representatives and the Senate create a conference committee to find a 
compromise that they can both accept, and the President will agree to sign.  
Thus farm bills are never conceived of, nor developed as, comprehensive and 
coherent policy initiatives. 
 
In addition the current structure of U.S. agriculture has reached a stage where 
multifunctionality is not an appealing option to most farm households.  Families 
on small farms derive little income from agriculture.  Indeed the most valuable 
government policy to them may well be the ability to shelter other income in their 
farm enterprise due to preferential tax treatment agriculture receives.  In addition 
operators of small farms make greater use of programs that withdraw land from 
production, further reducing their role in total agricultural output.  For this large 
group of farm families, the farm is already a lifestyle decision and arguably they 
are already operating their farm in a way that maximizes its non-market outputs. 
 
The relatively small number of commercial farms on the other hand have a vital 
stake in preserving the existing structure of commodity programs, because they 
account for a significant share of their income.  Commodity programs have led 
U.S. farmers to organize by commodity interest rather than as a single group.  
Members of each commodity group believe that any shift in payment structure 
can only leave them worse off, because the total level of payments is unlikely to 
expand enough to cover the amount going to new recipients. Further, 
membership of the House and Senate Agriculture Committees, where legislation 





farm policy system is both important and beneficial.  It is hard to imagine why 
they would embrace policies that if adopted would harm key constituents and 
their re-election prospects. 
 
From a national perspective, the simple fact that the United States produces far 
more food and fiber than it consumes and requires export markets to absorb the 
surplus also leads to a concern with how multifunctionality develops as a policy. 
Historically a U.S. policy that was geared to increasing production required a 
parallel policy to stimulate exports.  Even if policy becomes neutral in terms of 
promoting increased output, there will still have to be steady growth in world 
markets to absorb residual increases in farm output.  One of the lessons of past 
U.S. policy of decoupling payments from production is that farmers at an 
individual level respond to lower incomes by increasing their own production.  In 
price inelastic markets the resulting increase in supply makes everyone worse off 
because prices fall faster than output grows (Galbraith, 1995, pp. 75-76).  Further 
there is a perhaps unfounded impression in the United States and other countries 
that much of the support for implementing multifunctionality currently comes from 
countries with a relatively high cost agricultural sector that want to continue to 
support output rather than farm income (Freeman and Roberts, 2001). 
 
A sixth reason  relates to the way the concept of multifunctionality developed. 
Because many of the strongest initial advocates of multifunctionality have been 
countries with a high cost agriculture and high levels of subsidies there has been 
a natural suspicion about their motives.  Multifunctionality creates real problems 
for those seeking more open and transparent agricultural policy because it starts 
by linking non-market outputs to market outputs through joint production.  Such a 
structure has obvious potential to be manipulated in a way that allows farmers to 
effectively be paid for their commodity output because it is associated with some 
desirable non-market output.  To date many of these nations do not appear to be 
strongly committed to the major restructuring of agricultural policy that is required 
to truly implement the concept.  Thus it is likely that if multifunctionality is simply 
grafted onto an existing system of policy measures there is a good chance that it 
will lead to more trade distortions. This means that it is important to separate 
multifunctionality as a concept from the way multifunctionality has been proposed 
as a policy adjustment in practice. 
 
A seventh explanation for the lack of enthusiasm with multifunctionality can be 
found in the experience with multiple-use on public lands. Despite considerable 
effort over a long period of time to implement multiple use management on public 
lands there is still little agreement on how it should be done. Public forests have 
experimented with multiple-use management in various forms for over 100 years 
(Thomas, 1992).  While much of the experience has been positive in the sense 
that social welfare is probably higher than it would be if timber harvesting had 
dominated forest management, the difficulties of introducing a management 





(Prato, 2000).  The essential problem with valuing non-market outputs is that no 
method can claim broad support and so any plan can be easily challenged. 
 
Arguably the concept of balancing multiple outputs should be easier on public 
lands because while there are some outputs that have market prices the public 
sector is rarely under pressure to operate its enterprises to maximize profits.  
Further it is easier to have a policy implemented by employees of an agency than 
by independent agents who have their own set of objectives.  Farmers have a 
long history of taking government money and using it to implement actions that 
are in each individual￿s best interest.  While it is possible to monitor compliance 
and penalize those who do the wrong thing, this can be an expensive process 
and raises the price of the policy. 
 
Returning to the development of multiple-use and multifunctionality policies, it is 
important to think of the scale at which they are to be operated.  It is easy to say 
that agriculture is multifunctional, but at the farm level what outputs should be 
produced and who makes the decision?  Are all outputs required on all farms, 
and if not how much specialization is allowed.  Unless outputs occur in fixed 
proportions, which is an uninteresting case, how do you provide appropriate 
signals to individual producers so they produce the optimal mix of market and 
non-market outputs?  If farms can specialize, can regions?  At what level of 
geography do we require a mix of outputs and what outputs are part of that mix? 
Another potentially serious source of conflict could be the interests of land 
owners as opposed to farm operators.  Since roughly half of all land operated in 
the U.S. is rented or leased, and particular parcels can move from one condition 
to another unpredictably it will be important to find ways to reconcile the different 
interests of these two groups.  Who is responsible for ensuring multifunctionality 
objectives are met on a parcel of land and what incentives do they have to fully 
comply? 
 
Experience in the national forests shows how difficult this is. Each national forest 
in the United Stares has a management plan that tries to ensure that all outputs 
are considered and produced in the appropriate proportions.  Several decades 
ago the Forest Service experimented with large quantitative optimization models 
in the hope that the process of developing the ideal plan could be converted to a 
series of equations that would defuse conflict.  Not surprisingly the resulting 
plans were opposed by as many people as supported them.  This reflected the 
unfortunate reality that in many cases a desirable output for one group is an 
undesirable one for others.  For example, in the Forest Service experience off-
road vehicles and snowmobiles are very popular uses for one group of people 
but an anathema to another.  If both groups have standing as part of the public 
constituency, how can both their interests be reconciled?  Every management 
plan invites litigation by a group that believes the outputs it favors are being 
under produced or the outputs it dislikes are being over produced.  The result is 
huge expenditures on legal fees and court imposed moratoriums on 





probably a mistake to assume that there will be unanimous enthusiasm in any 
country over the way multifunctionality is implemented. 
 
Prospects for a Multifunctionality Based Farm Policy 
 
On the other hand there are forces that favor the adoption of a new approach. If 
a growing number of people believe that existing farm policy is truly not working 
then it will eventually have to change. In that process at least some part of the 
ideas underlying multifunctionality will emerge as potential elements in a new set 
of policy. 
 
While critics of multifunctionality point to its potential to be used to prop up 
production in countries with limited agricultural potential, they ignore the 
possibility that basing agricultural policy on multifunctionality may lead to  a 
reduction of commodity output in countries where subsidies are currently high. 
Whether payments induce or reduce output is a great extent a function of how 
they are implemented.  If farmers are required under multifunctionality based 
policies to adopt production technologies that increase the relative quantity of 
other outputs and reduce commodity output there should be less concern about 
trade distorting effects.  If people only want to see crops in a field they are just as 
a happy with lower planting rates or lower yield varieties. Once again, the critical 
issue is whether a completely new approach to agricultural policy is 
implemented, or whether multifunctionality payments are simply added on to the 
existing set of price support policies. 
 
Shifting support to mechanisms that discourage increases in output would 
provide a way to reduce production while protecting the farm population in those 
countries that are currently criticized for dumping their excess farm output on 
global markets. Bohman, Cooper, Mullarkey, Normile, Skully, Vogel and Young, 
(1999) developed a list of potential outputs of farming that is reproduced as 
Figure 1. Upon examining it, I suggest that virtually all the positive outputs in the 
list are more clearly identified with small farms and that most of the negative 
outputs are more likely to be associated with large farms. Positive signs in the 
figure indicate there is a positive relationship between higher levels of commodity 
output and the specific noncommodity output, negative signs indicate the 
opposite and no sign indicates no clear relationship. As others have noted many 
of the noncommodity outputs are associated with the land being in farming, not 
with  the level of commodity production (Abler, 2001b, p.19; Freeman and 
Roberts,1999, p.6)  
 
However the arguments for recognizing that agriculture produces multiple 
outputs go well beyond possible improvements in trade relations. I argued earlier 
that trade concerns are usually relatively minor issues in framing U.S.  
agricultural policy and were particularly irrelevant in the most recent farm bill 
exercise. And, if it is true that it is domestic policy that drives the farm bill, then 





its domestic policy implications. In particular a central tenet of U.S. farm policy 
has always been that it should help preserve family farms and allow these 
households to earn a reasonable return on their investment and labor.  Other 
important considerations are that there should be a safe, stable and reasonably 
priced supply of food and fiber for consumers; and that agriculture should not 
adversely affect the natural environment. Thus the desirability of a particular farm 
bill should be assessed in terms of how well it achieves balance among these 
goals. 
 
This begins to raise interesting questions of farm structure. To date most analysis 
of multifunctionality has approached the subject from an aggregate or sector 
production function. In reality there are many different production technologies in 
place at any point in time, and the mix of inputs and outputs may vary 
considerably across technologies. An obvious way to escape the trap of arguing 
over the degree of jointness in production is to accept that even if a given 
technology results in a fixed proportion of outputs, there are other technologies in 
use that produce different proportions of outputs. Thus a large array of output 
and input combinations is achievable by varying the mix of technologies that are 
applied. By choosing a technology that is appropriate to the resource endowment 
of a farm and the specific blend of outputs desired in a given region it should be 
possible to produce in aggregate a better mix of outputs.   
 
In essence this is the approach that underlies the Contrat Territorial 
d￿Exploitation (CTE) in France where regional goals for agriculture are 
implemented through individual farm contracts (Leger, 2001).  This approach 
recognizes that each farm has unique conditions and that some farms may 
choose to produce more or less of some outputs. The CTE is similar in concept 
to U.S. policies that were used to improve conservation at the farm and regional 
level including, Soil Conservation Service farm plans and resource conservation 
districts, and the farm programs of the Tennessee Valley Authority. U.S. 
experience with multiple use also suggests that individual parcels of land can 
only be managed to produce a small number of outputs and that the full mix of 
outputs is only achievable at a larger geographic scale.    
 
In both France and the United States some farms choose to participate in these 
programs and others do not. For some farms the benefits of specialization in 
traditional commodities dominate the returns from moving to a broader mix of 
outputs even if subsidies or taxes are in place. But once we accept that multiple 
outputs, including those without market prices are possible, we then have to be 
careful in defining what constitutes an efficient farm enterprise.  
 
From a strict comparison of market prices, large farms are typically more efficient 
than small ones, but they often produce more negative than positive 
environmental, social and cultural externalities.  For example, a small cattle farm 
that raises cattle with a high ratio of land per animal produces positive visual 





because it provides a useful fertilizer function.  In contrast a large confined 
feeding enterprise may produce meat at a lower unit cost but provides no visual 
amenities and the volume of manure produced is a major negative environmental 
consequence because there is too much to be assimilated. Further, small farms 
have a clear advantage in preserving traditional farm culture and contributing to 
the broader rural community. Obviously if we change both the mix of farm 
outputs and relative prices then we are likely to revise our description of an 
efficient farm. 
 
At present the perceived efficiency of large farms is based upon specialization of 
output that results in underproduction of socially desirable outputs. If a broader 
set of outputs, including positive and negative externalities is considered large 
farms may not be seen as being clearly more efficient. Given that existing farm 
policy has encouraged the shift toward larger, more specialized farms, a 
comprehensive shift in farm policy that encouraged multiple outputs could over 
time result in fewer large specialized farms and more small mixed farms.  
Decoupling government payments from production and lowering the maximum 
payment per farm is a first step in this process. FSRIA continues decoupled 
payments and tightens the payment limits. However the increase in 
countercyclical payments offsets this change by continuing to reward large 
producers. To the extent that price supports encourage the expansion of 
production by reducing the level of risk associated with specialization and 
expansion there is an incentive for farmers to find ways to increase output.  
 
Such a change would likely to lead to a reduction in aggregate commodity output 
and higher unit costs of production for commodities that have received the most 
support in the past.  But a major point of multifunctionality is that the current set 
of farm policies under-values the non-commodity outputs of agriculture by linking 
payments to production, so for domestic consumers an increase in other outputs 
may more than offset the higher costs of market commodities. This type of 
change could be desirable both domestically, if it increased the production of 
non-market goods, and internationally, if it created opportunities for developing 
countries to expand their agricultural exports. In principle farm income could even 
increase if the demand curve is inelastic because price increases would more 
than offset the fall in production.    
 
If multifunctionality is to become the basis for developing farm policy in the 
United States it will have to come from a recognition that the existing way that 
farm policy is defined and implemented is not adequately serving the broader 
interests of the American public.  For American agriculture to really be 
responsive to a larger constituency than the commodity interests that now 
dominate its development, a significant shift in orientation will be required. A 
similar point has been made by Blandford and Boisvert (2002b), Randall (2002) 
and Regidor (2002).  Their argument is that many of the non-commodity outputs 
of agriculture are territorially specific and provide local benefits that can only be 





supporting agriculture through payments for the production of commodities have 
little hope of ensuring that the resulting spatial distribution of commodities will 
result in a desirable mix of all outputs.  
 
This means that agricultural policy should not be based upon a small set of 
national commodity policies but has to be formed at a local level.  In essence 
appropriate agricultural policy becomes more like other forms of rural policy - 
something that can best be defined at the local level.  In the United States this 
how the original farm policy of the 1930s was defined (Cochrane, 1993). County 
committees were given considerable discretion in how policy was implemented at 
the local level.  At the time this reflected the impossibility of managing policies 
with even a limited degree of flexibility from a national office.  Over time the 
degree of local control and flexibility has declined as technology and a declining 
number of farms allowed centralization.   
 
As noted earlier, one of the lessons from the U.S. experience with multiple use is 
that only local managers can decide what mix of outputs is best suited to a 
specific site. Variability in local conditions that affect both demand and supply 
characteristics make external decisions on types and levels of output unlikely to 
meet local needs.  Since most of the external effects of agriculture are local in 
nature this is an important issue. Because farms cover a large share of the 
territory of the United States a second implication of a growing concern with non-
market outputs is the distribution of payments.  If farm policy is to induce 
increased attention by farmers on non-market outputs they will have to be directly 
affected by the policies. But even at the local level the task of reconciling 
appropriate levels of market priced commodities and non-market valued other 
outputs will be a major challenge (Randall, 2002).   
 
At present less than 40 percent of all farms receive any government payment 
and payments are disproportionately concentrated on large farms producing a 
small number of crops, most of which are far from population centers. If 
government payments are needed to increase the volume of non-market outputs 
and the demand for these outputs is local in nature, then the geographic 
distribution of payments will have to change to one that is both more widely 
dispersed in the sense that more farms are recipients and one that increases the 
supply of non-market outputs more in areas where the demand is highest.  
Logically this should make farms in close proximity to population concentrations 
more likely to receive higher payments, but other farms with unique output 
opportunities, such as endangered species or historic features, may also benefit.  
 
Advocates of public support for agriculture in the U.S. and other countries always 
base their argument for government programs on: preserving small farms as part 
of the national culture, helping maintain a pristine natural environment, sustaining 
agriculture￿s contribution to a traditional rural way of life and ensuring a 
wholesome food supply; not on subsidizing wealthy, large scale, mechanized 





commodity. These advocates neglect to point out that over the period of time that 
price support programs have been in place there has been a significant reduction 
in those attributes we were supposedly protecting. The FSRIA clearly reinforces 
the traditional set of farm policies and therefore cannot be seen as contributing to 
acceptance of multifunctionality as a way to think about agricultural policy. 
 
Any farm policy ultimately alters the environment in which farms operate, favoring 
some regions, commodities and farm types over others. It does this because the 
point of farm policy is to change the conditions under which agriculture operates. 
The question for policy analysts is whether the changes that result are the 
intended ones and whether the benefits from the change exceed the full set of 
costs associated with the policy.  
 
Over time the cumulative effects of farm policy have important effects upon the 
structure of agriculture - determining the number and size of farms, the mix of 
outputs they produce, and how farm output is produced and marketed. In both 
Europe and the United States there is a growing interest in how farming is 
organized and whether agriculture is providing an appropriate mix of outputs.  As 
public funds have become an increasingly large share of total cash receipts in 
farming, there has been a steady increase in the number of people on both 
continents who argue that farm policy should be shaped by more than the 
interests of farmers, and that what is best for farmers may not be best for society. 
 
A number of factors drive this concern.  The first is a simple fiscal interest ￿ if the 
public is providing a significant share of the funds going to farmers then there 
should be some degree of public input in how these farms are operated. The 
second is a more specific manifestation of this oversight right.  Farmers have 
historically argued that they are wise stewards of the environment, yet it is 
increasingly clear that a number of common agricultural practices can have clear 
adverse environmental consequences, including manure disposal, soil erosion  
and loss of wildlife habitat; while others have questionable effects, including 
pesticide use, broad use of hormones and antibiotics in feed, and genetic 
modification. As a result there is a strong sense that public policy should compel 
farmers to recognize the externalities associated with their activities and induce 
them to take the full set of outputs into consideration. The final element is a 
recognition that farming has consequences that go beyond market outputs and 
environmental impacts. These include impacts on developing countries, visual 
amenity issues and a desire to maintain cultural aspects of farming. 
 
The interest in multifunctionality can be seen as a reflection of these questions 
about the role of agriculture, and as the interest increases there is a greater 
chance that more of the basic elements that define multifunctionality will become 
more relevant to agricultural policy. In both Europe and the United States interest 
in multifunctionality has increased as the share of household income spent on 
food declines and as the volume of farm output continues to expand at a rate 





provided by farms have become almost as important as traditional food security 
and conservation issues in many places. The point that has not been as clearly 
made is that the structure of agriculture, that is the specific types and sizes of 
farms and the technologies that are employed, is central in how well the farm 
sector meets these goals. 
 
In both the USA and the EU, farm policy has not kept up with the change in 
public attitude.  For a number of reasons farm policy has remained narrowly 
focused on the financial returns to farmers from producing specific commodities. 
In both instances farm policy was structured to provide support through 
payments per unit of output.  Consequently larger farms received larger 
payments and over time there was a tendency for large farms to displace small 
farms.  In part this phenomenon reflected technological change that favored 
larger establishments, but it also reflected the effect of farm policy that reduced 
the risks associated with specialization and expansion by providing payments 
that stabilized or enhanced income.  
 
And in both Europe and the United States there is a growing recognition that 
farming is more than the production of agricultural commodities, and that current 
trends in agriculture, which increase output while reducing the number of 
farmers, have undesirable consequences in terms of environmental impacts, and 
in terms of social and cultural effects. Not only are many of the outputs of 
agriculture not priced, but many of them have public good aspects and their 
values are determined within a given socio-cultural context.  While the average 
American may place little value on preserving small farming communities in 
Nebraska, there is no reason to believe that the average Frenchman similarly 
values small farm villages in Burgundy. This means that there is likely to be even 
larger differences among national farm policies if they shift to meeting demands 




For multifunctionality to become accepted as a principle for organizing 
agricultural policy in the United States two major changes will be required.  The 
first is to recognize that the concept is more than a device for creating trade 
barriers and that it is a way to think about balancing the multiple outputs of 
agriculture in a way that increases aggregate social welfare. The second and 
more difficult change is that the United States would have to fundamentally alter 
the way it develops farm policy to fully implement the approach. 
 
Prospects for a broader acceptance of the concept seem stronger with each 
succeeding farm bill as: the costs of the traditional policy mount, its ability to 
support farm household welfare declines, and alternative claims on scarce 
federal funds become more pressing.  Within the farm community more farmers 





price support programs which has led to splits within agriculture about how policy 
should be designed. 
 
Prospects for a change in how policy is formed are less likely. For 
multifunctionality to provide a better approach to policy there will have to be a 
more coherent and unified policy development process.  At a minimum this will 
mean that the various subcommittees of the Agriculture Committees will have to 
give up their lead role in developing specific titles of the farm bill so that individual 
programs can be more closely aligned to achieve balance in the policy signals 
that are provided to farmers. In reality the entire process of periodic farm bills that 
must be passed in order to avoid the disaster of the permanent legislation 
coming into effect will have to change. The prospects for this are much less 
likely, although the agriculture committees are far less influential than they were 
ten years ago and lose power each time redistricting occurs.  
 
Historically what has been good politically in the United States has generally 
been more important than what is good policy.  It is hard to see why elected 
representatives would willingly give up, their influence over policy to the 
executive branch of government.  The history of farm bills shows that political 
influence of key individuals is a critical factor in explaining legislative outcomes. 
And these outcomes are typically what best serves the short term re-election 
prospects of individuals and political parties. 
 
However the largest impediment is the widely held belief in the United States that 
an active role by government in management decisions of firms of any type is 
likely to be undesirable.  There is a widely held suspicion of the ability of 
government to perform better than the market.  By definition multifunctionality 
demands a more proactive government role because of the existence of non-
market goods and joint production.  Even if it possible to argue that markets 
might be created for some of the current set of non-market outputs, the simple 
fact that markets do not currently exist suggests that government will have to 
help create and maintain pseudo-markets until they are large enough and 
developed to the point that they become self-sustaining.  
 
Because this change in the policy process could not be restricted to only 
agricultural policy, it would entail a radical change in the way all policies are 
developed in America.  Without broader policy reform it is unlikely that 
multifunctionality can be fully implemented in the United States.   
 
However there are better prospects for agricultural policy to be further broadened 
to make it more responsive to the demand for non-market goods.  USDA policies 
have often been implemented at a local level through county officials and county 
committees.  It would not be a large leap to take existing conservation programs 
and broaden them to include more amenity concepts as factors in farm plans.  
The FSARI act already provides increased funding for conservation and 





approach fails to incorporate jointness in production, it may get the United States 
a long way closer to providing a better balanced set of agricultural outputs and 
address critical structure issues in agriculture.   
 
On balance FSARI probably is a step backward in the development of a U.S. 
agricultural policy that recognizes a broader ser of outputs for agriculture. But 
even so FSARI contains important elements that could be part of this type of 
policy.  A broader agricultural policy in the United States is inevitably going to be 
different than the type of policy implemented in Europe because geographic, 
social and political conditions are different.  American agriculture is not part of 
society in the same way that it is in Europe and physical distance and the size of 
the land base allow and perhaps require a different approach.  Nevertheless both 
societies seem to want the same broad set of outputs from agriculture and 
existing policy has not shown it can produce them. This leaves an opportunity for 
future change, but to be successful in altering how agriculture operates the 
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Table 1: Farm Characteristics
Rural residence Intermediate Commercial
Number of farms 1,356,047 655,812 175,091
Share of Farms 62.0% 30.0% 8.0%
Avg. Value of Production $10,074 $64,117 $687,065
Share of Production 8% 24% 68%
Gross Farm Income $17,952 $76,237 $609,810
Net Farm Income $2,310 $12,998 $115,832
Gov’t Payments $1,437 $9,254 $41,218
Share of Payments 13% 40% 47%
Total Household Earnings $67,371 $43,390 $135,397
Category Definitions
Rural residence:Gross sales below $250,000 and farming is a 
secondary activity for the operator
Intermediate: Gross sales below $250,000 but farming is 
the main operator activity
Commercial: Gross sales above $250,000.
Source: USDA Food and Agricultural Policy
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Some Nonfood By-products of Agriculture
Environmental Food Security
Positive Elimination of Hunger +
Open space Asure Availability of food supply +
Scenic vistas -
Isolation from congestion  
Watershed protection Rural Development
Flood control
Groundwater recharge - Rural income and employment -





Odor + Traditional country life -
Nutrient/pesticide runoff + Small farm strcture -
Watershed protection Cultural heritage -
Flood control
Soil erosion
Biodiversity loss + the + and - signs denote the effect of intensity of output
Wildlife Habitat + on the amount of the by-product
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